Bliss Perry. Originally published in Spring 2018.

To many natives of the region commonly known as “Eastern Europe,” the label connotes a certain cultural dreariness and political suppression, packaged in a row of Stalinist apartment complexes imported from the Soviet Union. While many outsiders have traditionally halved Europe into the two sides defined by a north-south axis running roughly from Berlin, Germany to Trieste, Italy, to Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians, this binary division obscures centuries of prior history.

The term the natives prefer—and one that is increasingly prevalent—is “Central-European.” Indeed, for most of modern history, the nations located between Germany and the former Soviet Union and now affiliated with the concept of an “Eastern Europe” were ruled or closely tied to centrally-located powers such as Prussia or Austro-Hungary rather than Russia. Although traditionally dominated by German speakers in capitals such as Vienna and Berlin, Central Europe—also known as Mitteleuropa—spanned a large region from Bohemia to Belgrade and from Ljubljana to Lviv. The inhabitants of this region, a diverse group of Germans, Slavs, Hungarians, Romanians, Jews, Roma, and more, were for the most part united by their allegiance to one of the large, powerful monarchies of the area. The history shared by the region can be discerned most visibly through the similar architecture and culinary styles found throughout the region, whether in Krakow, Zagreb, or Prague. Remarkably, this legacy lives on even after 50 years of Soviet political and architectural influence.

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, political commentators have correctly predicted a resurgence of the Central European states. Having effectively and successfully switched to capitalism in the 1990s, most of the region’s countries joined the European Union as part of the 2004 enlargement. Significant regional cooperation initiatives have been put in place, including the Visegrád Group, a military alliance composed of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Tourism has flourished as Western Europeans have come to rediscover the beautiful region once hidden behind the screen of communist occupation.

Most prominently, though, Central Europe has distinguished itself through a rise in nationalistic right-wing regimes. In Hungary, the conservative party, Fidesz, has been in power since 2010, with Viktor Orban, the prime minister, serving as the figurehead of the political movement. In Poland, Andrzej Duda of the similar Law and Justice Party has been president since 2015, influenced strongly by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the party’s leader. Most recently, populist leaders have also come into power in the Czech Republic and in Austria, with Czech billionaire-turned-politician Andrej Babis acting as prime minister and the young Austrian Sebastian Kurz, leader of the Austrian People’s Party, elected as chancellor. All of these regimes can largely be characterized by heightened nationalism, Islamophobia, and opposition to immigration. Understanding the historical context for these regimes can shed more light onto why the people of Central Europe have repeatedly elected populist leaders who espouse these values.

First, the heightened nationalism in Central Europe is likely a reaction to centuries of political suppression by foreign powers. Many of the Central European states only achieved modern-day independence in the late nineteenth or twentieth centuries, after being ruled primarily by the dual Habsburg monarchy of Austro-Hungary. Under Austro-Hungarian rule, the display and celebration of local culture was more than often strongly discouraged, especially for Slavic groups, and policies were enacted to promote German, and to a lesser extent Hungarian, as official languages. Other nations that flourished under Habsburg rule suffered from national humiliation in the interwar period after the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Hungary itself lost over 60 percent of its territory as part of the Treaty of Trianon, only to come under control of a Nazi puppet regime a few decades later. After that, of course, came 50 years of political suppression by the Soviet regime in Moscow. One could therefore view the resurgence of nationalist rhetoric and policy in Central Europe as the region’s way of reasserting its autonomous identity after so many years of subordination. Recent rallies such as the 2017 Polish Independence Day celebrations in Warsaw further demonstrate the current vibrancy of nationalism in this corner of Europe.

A similar examination helps to contextualize the region’s xenophobia and particularly its fear of Muslim immigrants. For much of its history, Central Europe served as a constant battlefront between the Christian West and the Muslim armies of the Ottoman Empire attacking from holdings in the Balkans. The Ottomans ruled most of Hungary until finally withdrawing from the country in 1718, at the same time laying siege to Austrian Vienna in 1529 and 1683. Meanwhile, the southern reaches of Poland, then ruled by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, faced significant threat from Ottoman armies, with Polish forces fighting the Turks many times and turning the tide at the 1683 siege of Vienna. In contrast to the nations of Western Europe, Central European nations faced Islamic incursion for centuries; therefore, Islamophobia and fear of immigration in general seems to be more deeply ingrained and palpable among the people of the region.

Overall, history can offer some explanation for the current disposition of Central European governments, in particular perspectives other than those echoed by many critics of Central Europe today. Nevertheless, the past should not be used to justify harmful sentiments of the present. Rather, Central Europe should seize the opportunity to abandon historical grudges held over the past and to integrate with Europe to the maximum extent possible, fueling itself on the back of newly earned political, economic, and cultural momentum after a post-1991 rebirth. In any case, building fences along borders with EU allies and maintaining a hardline stance on immigration certainly does not bode well for the future of Central Europe and the wider region in general.