Michel Li. Originally published in Winter 2018.

General Secretary Xi Jinping opened China’s 19th Communist Party Congress in mid-October with the following sentiment: “We will not tolerate anyone, using any means, at any time to separate one inch of land from China. Blood is thicker than water.” The meeting of the National Congress, a much-anticipated meeting that occurs every five years, serves as a platform for the Party to broadcast its vision for the country. In the latest meeting, Xi Jinping delivered his vision for the country, a unified country. Most observers interpret this statement in the context of PRC relationships with Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, the Communist Party’s concern for Chinese unity and sovereignty also extends westward into China’s largest administrative region—Xinjiang.

Xinjiang, one of China’s five autonomous regions, is heavily populated by over nine million Uyghurs—a Muslim ethnic minority group that identifies as significantly different from the Han majority in culture and religion. Historically, the Communist Party has struggled to govern this region effectively; outbreaks of violence frequently occur in Xinjiang, oftentimes in the form of standoffs between Uyghur and Han ethnic groups.

As a result, Xinjiang is under tight security. This is a manifestation of the long-standing party commitment to combat the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism, reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi at the recent Party Congress. In the eyes of many international journalists and academics, the region is essentially run as a modern police state. The area is saturated with police officers and Chinese flags. Security cameras line the streets, using sophisticated data analytic and tracking technologies to closely follow persons of interest and suspicious behavior.  The number of advertised police jobs in just the year 2016 exceeded the number advertised between 2008 and 2012 by 30,000.

This type of security developed in response to increasing levels of violence and unrest over the past decade. The largest and most alarming event took place in the summer of 2009, instigated by the East Turkestan Independence Movement, that is associated with Uyghur individuals. The ensuing riots left over 200 dead, and ultimately required the Communist Party to bring in the troops of the People’s Liberation Army. Knife attacks in the region have also been on the rise. An attack this past February left eight dead, with no ofcial release of details regarding the ethnic background of the attacker or victims.

In addition to increasing security measures, Xinjiang officials have implemented a series of policies restricting behaviors associated with traditional Urghur cultural and religious practices, in their efforts to curb “extremism.” These measures were adopted following the appointment of Cheng Quanguo as the Party Secretary—the top political position in Xinjiang—in 2016; he had formerly occupied the same position in Tibet and was known for his hard-line stance. The legislation went into effect in April of this year, banning the “abnormal growing of beards,” the wearing of religious veils in public places, and the “naming of children to exaggerate religious fervor.” The disruption of Uyghur daily life and religious expression has bred resentment in the population, contributing to extremist sentiment, assembly, and activity.

Xinjiang policy delegitimizes Uyghur language and historical legacy, causing alarm among Uyghurs by foreboding a process of cultural extinction. XinJiang authorities have also banned the use of Uyghur language textbooks in schools and enacted quotas for the detainment and re-education of Uyghurs. Individuals sent to these camps lose contact with family members and friends. Fears of cultural degradation are exacerbated by the deterioration of historical artifacts such as the karaz, a network of underground tunnels dug by hand over many centuries that acts as a source of Uyghur pride. Although local officials have spent considerable resources to protect this artifact, only a quarter of the network remains today, whereas three quarters of the tunnels have survived in Iran.

All of these measures, while intended to prevent violent activity, have contributed to Uyghur frustration with ruling figures. Moreover, this frustration is exacerbated by inconsistencies in government policy. Though the Party Secretary and Xinjiang officials have passed the aforementioned restrictions, the Central Government publicly advocates religious and cultural protection, leaving the regional governments to carry out the persecutory measures.

While implementing restrictive policies behind the scenes through regional officials, the Central Government has appeared to try to stabilize Xinjiang through protecting minority cultures and promoting economic development. Public statements supporting the diversity and growth abound in state-run media. By reducing economic inequality through poverty alleviation programs, the Central Government says that it hopes to reduce tension between Uyghurs and the Han Chinese ruling class. However, these programs are not entirely rhetoric, as they have been relatively successful; officials have vowed to lift all individuals above the poverty line by 2020.

Government leaders have taken two main approaches toward stabilizing XinJiang: restricting religious and cultural expression, and reducing economic inequality. Given China’s political structure, the Central Government technically supports both initiatives but only explicitly assumes responsibility for the latter strategy. Thus, the Uyghurs see these two policies as contradictory, decrying the government’s failure to take responsibility for the restrictions on their freedom of cultural and religious exercise. This sentiment may intensify Uyghur violence against the regional government officials for not acting in line with the Central Government’s claimed policy.

As such, Chinese officials have found themselves in a Catch-22, attempting to prevent extremism and promote peace but in reality fueling greater frustration among the Uyghur minority. However, in the eyes of the Communist Party, China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang is indisputable. They undeniably belong to the Chinese family. The Party worries that emerging differences between these regions and mainstream China may spur separatist movements. Thus, the Chinese government believes it can suppress these differences by sending the message that any acts of rebellion will not be tolerated. The process of promoting unity, or at least what the government considers its policies, may further isolate China’s kin from the mainland.

At the same time, Xinjiang may want to reassess the costs and benefits of its independence. Under Chinese Communist Party rule, the region has experienced economic growth, facilitated by the Central Government’s assistance and China’s larger economic growth. Though XinJiang’s independence may release its people from cultural and religious repression, there is no guarantee that a subsequent regime would bring about financial stability or greater freedom of expression. Ultimately, regardless of these varying rationales, the Central Government continues to stand steadfast in its rejection of Xianjiang independence.