Romano Prodi served as prime minister of Italy (1996 to 1998; 2006 to 2008) and the 10th president of the European Commission (EC) (1999 to 2004). Prior to holding these positions, he served as a professor of economics and chairman of the Institute for Industrial Reconstruction. During his time as prime minister, he reformed the government’s employment and pension policies and significantly decreased the budget deficit, allowing Italy to join the European Monetary Union. While serving on the EC, he expanded the European Union to include Malta, Cyprus, and eight eastern and central European members. He is considered the founder of the Italian center-left and an important economic figure of the Second Republic in Italian political history. Originally published in Winter 2018.

What were some of your main initiatives during your terms as prime minister?

In Italy, the challenge was to fix the budget, diminish the debt, and rejuvenate the economy. Politically, it was a great challenge to renovate the Italian political system. The Berlin Wall was dividing the country into two, between communists and anti-communists. This was paralyzing in some ways for Italian politics because you couldn’t tackle the necessary reforms due to this split, so my idea was to found a new movement called “The Olive Tree Coalition,” which put together all the reformers to try to rearrange Italian politics. I collected all the reformers—from socialists on the left and the Christian Democratic Party to the liberals—to rearrange Italian politics. And it was successful; we won re-election. The first goal was met, but after a couple of years internal struggles of non-amalgamated groups broke the government. We were successful in the beginning but not successful in the end because of previous tensions.

Could you talk about your experience as the 10th president of the European Commission?

From an economic standpoint, we were successful in decreasing debt; the debt-to-GDP ratio decreased substantially. But internal political struggles made it impossible to enact many things. This was the main aim but we [also enacted] social decisions, welfare systems, school systems, and so on. I had three to four main goals. First, which seems minor from the outside but important from inside the European institution, was to reform the internal structure and governors of the Commission. It came after a crisis that forced my predecessor to resign, and we tried to increase the director general’s transparency.

We decided to include five new countries in the European Union, and we had 10 new members in five years. Maybe this could be criticized, but I’m proud of that achievement because it was very simple. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was clear that there was a very dangerous gray area for the future of Europe, and that it was necessary to fill the vacuum as soon as possible. Imagine if Poland should be in the same situation that Ukraine is in today—how big would this tragedy be—so it was a great priority.  Now of course there is tension and anti-European feelings, but any alternative in my opinion was absolutely worse, so I think this was really successful. Then, it was necessary to start again the process of economic convergence; in general terms, you have a high degree of economic disparity in the country. The goal was to balance more of the European growth, but of course, one failed—the constitution. We did it after two years of difficult negotiation, we got a good compromise, though not ideal. But then the Dutch and French referendum blocked it. And I think this was the beginning of the European decay. There were other goals; for example, we were successful in organizing the Kyoto protocol—the first international climate change and environment project.

Working for the European Commission was very different. The daily political tension was debilitating, but in Brussels it was much less. I could reinforce the rule of the commission, and this was one of the reasons I wasn’t reappointed. I’m being very honest to tell you that it was my desire to be reappointed but it was impossible because the political majority changed from center-left to center-right, and also because of the rise of center-left government like Blair government in the United Kingdom.

What do the recent elections in France and the September 24, 2017 election results in Germany mean for the future of Europe?

The Macron election is a pro-European plan, but the change in American policy has injected some sense of insecurity in Europe. After Brexit, the only country with the nuclear bomb and good grip over security is France. There is now a need for balance—to reorganize Europe into some type of community. This is also a project for Germany. Some sort of negotiation or dialogue with Europe. I do think that difference can be a new chapter for Europe and a positive moment for the future European Union. In France, there’s only interest to break the political state in Europe, but at this moment it’s difficult to say how practical that would be.

How can Europe regain legitimacy when the rise in populism points to popular discontent in Europe?

You take a microscopic analysis and ask about Europe, and you get a very negative opinion. But if you get out of the European Union… Let us distinguish between some sort of uneasiness within Europe and the will to get out. For instance, in the Dutch referendum if you put the question of yes or no it’s almost always yes. The populistic movement is not the majority but they are able to in some way to modify the political goals. I don’t think they will kill Europe, but they will certainly damage it.

Why has Italy been relatively exempt from major terrorist attacks (since the 1980s)? Is it partly due to particular policies to counter terrorism?

What happened till now could happen in the future. Maybe the explanation is that there are very few second-generation immigrants and generally they are more likely to become radicalized or could potentially be radicalized. Maybe it’s because our police have been trained so well against terrorism during the red brigade period. Nobody can tell you which is the actual reason. But we are not absolutely immune from terrorism. Clearly, it’s remarkable that there is great progress, more than people think, in the exchange of intelligence between secret services. This has been very useful, for example, when they arrested the terrorist in Milan.