Pedro Paulo Weizenmann. Originally published in Fall 2018.

Revolution has different meanings for different peoples. For Americans, it meant freedom to lead their lives according to their own beliefs, unencumbered by arbitrary abuse of power. For the French, the end of monarchy and a nation unified by republican ideals. For Mexicans, the promise of greater equality. Unlike the first two peoples, Mexicans have not seen the goal of their revolution solidified. It remains a promise that requires constant struggle. By imbedding himself in this great national tradition, Andrés Manuel López Obrador disenchanted the electoral tsunami that marked this year's Mexican elections (El País, Javier Moreno).

According to Obrador's historical framework, his election represents the forth great transformation of Mexico's “permanent revolution”, after the Independence (1821), the Reform (1855-63) and the 1910 Revolution. All the previous stages were spurred by the same drive for equality, the drive against some privileged elites benefitting in spite of the larger poorer population. All of them eventually failed in this task, and structural inequality led the country to endemic corruption and violence. But it was precisely by addressing these key issues during times of massive corruption scandals, nearly half the population under poverty, and record level killings, that Obrador was elected. “The state will cease to be a committee at the service of a minority and will represent all Mexicans, rich and poor”, he stated in his first speech after winning the elections. “We will hear, serve, and respect everyone, but we will give preference to the most humble and forgotten”.

Though critics emphasize how Obrador does not fully explain what his plan is to address the problems he frequently commented on during his campaign, Obrador clearly has the support of his people for the beginning of his pursuits. Over half of the electorate voted for him, which makes his margin of victory the largest in Mexico since before the country became a full democracy in the 1980s. For comparison, the previous president had been elected with 38% of the popular vote. Moreover, although his party (Movement for National Regeneration, or Morena) did not exist at the time of the previous election, Obrador's coalition claimed an outright majority in both houses of Mexico's Congress as well as eight state governor races and Mexico City's mayor's office. All this together is unprecedent in Mexican democratic history.

More than genuine belief and hope that Obrador will lead Mexico in its “new revolutionary path,” however, his election represents the Mexican cry for change given the failure of the traditionally stablished parties (PRI, PAN and PRD) to be close to the population. After controlling Mexican politics for decades, these parties were trialed by the endemic corruption schemes on which they had to rely, the increasing violence from the drug trafficking problem, and the structural economic inequality that has privileged certain groups since the time of colonization. “There is so much wrong. I think some people voted for López Obrador, but the majority voted for a change that we need,” said Fernando Torres,a 23-year-old publicity agent, to The Washington Pos. Juan de Dios Rodríguez, 70, a farmer in the state of Hidalgo, and a longtime bastion of the PRI, was more explicit on his interview with The New York Times: “It is time for a change, it's time to go with López Obrador, and see what happens (…) This will be my first time voting for a different party”.

Obrador's main opponents were José Antonio Meade, from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and Ricardo Anayda, from the National Action Party (PAN). The PRI ran Mexican presidency from 1930 to 2000 (such an uninterrupted rule was described as a “perfect dictatorship” by Peruvian Nobel Prize laureate for literature Mario Vargas Llosa), when the party was finally defeated by PAN's candidate Vincent Fox. After subsequent 12 years of PAN's rule, marked by fiscally conservative economic policies, openness to foreign investors and close relationship with the US, the PRI came back to power with Enrique Peña Nieto. While Nieto was a centrist that maintained the status quo with some promises of renewal, his government was marked by multiple corruption scandals that sharply decreased his approval ratings. This can largely explain why the PRI only achieved 16% of the popular in this year's elections. The PAN, however, did not perform much better either. The party achieved only 22% of the popular vote even though it gained the support of the center-left PRD (the Party of the Democratic Revolution) in an unprecedent realignment of Mexican traditional parties. This can be explained by how Obrador's new party, Morena, coopted many of the original PRD members, shifting what was remained of the party to the right. Overall, though, the defeat of the established parties clearly show how Mexicans voted for a break with the status quo, be it understood as widespread endemic corruption or economic policies that are not perceived to benefit the population as a whole.

Obrador's support from over 50% of voters demonstrates that his message of change could reconciliate people from opposite sides of the political spectrum and different sectors of society. The unusual realignment of Mexican parties was not only present in Obrador opponents' coalitions, but also in Obrador's coalition itself. In order to face the traditional parties PRI, PAN and PRD, Obrador formed a coalition that included not only his party formed to a great extent by PRD dissidents, but also the far-left Labor Party (PT) largely formed by unions and workers' movements as well as the far-right Social Encounter Party (PES) mostly formed by evangelical Christians. The main way Obrador united these groups was through a message that strongly condemned endemic corruption in Mexico in a explicit rejection of the parties that have ruled Mexico in the past decades. More than that, though, Obrador combined the leftist economic concerns over extreme poverty and inequality with the social conservatism of the evangelicals that opposes abortion and gay marriage. Inquired by fellow leftists concerned by his take on social issues, Obrador suggested that fighting poverty and graft were the more important priorities for progressives, minimizing opposing interests of the groups supporting his coalition: “The most important thing is honesty. [Decriminalizing abortion and marriage equality] – with total respect and authenticity, I consider it something not that important. What’s important in Mexico is that we end corruption.” (2015 interview with W Radio). Because of these curious approaches, Obrador has been described by Deutsche Welle as “the man that oscillates between Jesus Christ and Che Guevara”. His younger son, for example, was named after the two of them: his name is “Jesus Ernesto” and is 10 years old.

Despite his overwhelming support from diverse sectors of Mexican society, it is unclear how exactly Obrador plans to deliver his promises. A criticism that is commonly directed to populists worldwide can also be directed to Obrador: he gives simplistic answers to complex structural problems, often with a restricted voluntarist mindset that does not coherently explain what the path for change will be. “Only I can fix corruption”, he says, suggesting that his moral role as a president that does not tolerate corruption will be enough to solve an endemic problem. The fact he does not develop a coherent approach to fighting corruption is not only alarming because he was largely elected through the people's hope to solve this problem, but also because he is counting on the billions of pesos he claims Mexico will save by cutting corruption and waste to invest on social programs. Since Obrador insists he will not raise taxes, it is through this uncertain revenue over fighting corruption that he expects to deliver a broad range of social programs promised during his campaign that are targeted towards fighting extreme poverty and inequality. Even more unsettling, however, is that Obrador has no concrete plans to face the problem of violence in Mexico, after a decade of consistently growing number of homicides since the military itself was deployed to face the powerful drug cartels.

Obrador's practical plans may be unclear, but if there is one thing his widespread popular support gave him, it is an unprecedent ease in governance that enables him to quickly set his actions of change in motion. He had 53% of the popular vote and his party Morena controls over half of the seats in both houses of Mexican congress besides the direct support of eight state governors plus Mexico City's mayor office. Such strong power on the hands of the president, on the other hand, raises concerns on some political scientists. They are skeptical about whether Obrador will keep his commitment to democratic rule or will overthrow some of Mexican's legislation in order to increase his time on government, make the playfield tilted against the opposition, or support other initiatives that may undermine democracy. Ultimately, it is in Mexico's best interest that Obrador's message of a “fourth great transformation” in Mexican history towards greater equality succeed, but it remains to be seen whether (and if so, how) Obrador will live up to his people's expectations.